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FATIGUE AND ASSOCIATED PERFORMANCE DECREMENTS
IN AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS
by
E. Gene Lyman and Captain Harry W. Orlady
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SUM*SARY
A study of safety reports submitted to the NASA Aviation Safety Report-
ing System (ASRS) was conducted to examine the hypothesis that fatigue and
associated performance decrements occur in air transport operations, and that
these are associated with some combination of the factors: circadian desyn-
chronosis, duty time, pre-duty activity, sleep, work scheduling, workload,
and environmental deprivation. The findings of the study are based on a
selected sample of reported incidents in which the reporter associated
fatigue with the occurrence.
In comparing the fatigue reports with a control set, significant perfor-
mance decrements were found to exist related to time-of-day, awareness and
attention to duty, and - less significa;,tly - final phases of flights. The
majority of the fatigue incidents involved such unsafe events as altitude
deviations, takeoffs and landings without clearance, and the like. Perfor-
mance decrements explicitly associated with fatigue are reported infrequently
to the Aviation Safety Reporting System and are of a kind differing only in
frequency from reports of those occurring in the absence of fatigue.
Nevertheless, these fatigue-associated decrements resulted in substant_ve
potentially unsafe aviation conditions. Considerations of duty and sleep are
the major factors in the reported fatigue conditions.
INTRODUCTION
This report describes a study to assess the effects of fatigue on air
crew ;performance in transport operations where information from the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) data fiiles comprised the principal study
resource. NASA requested the study in connection with its larger effort to
identify and investigate factors contributing to human error in aviation
operations. One facet of that effort is the investigation of the effects of
fatigue on flight deck operations. The present study is supportive of that
effort.
Aviation operational management has always recognized fatigue as a fac-
tor that can adversely affect human performance. Fatigue, however, has eluded
rigorous, quantitative definition; as a consequence, the nature of its
effects are not completely known (1)*. The minimization of unwanted fatigue
effects in organized industry has largely been accomplished by means of work
rules. In aviation, these work rules a-e reviewed frequently and from time
to time new ones are postulated (2,3). Consideration is given in the formu-
lation of these rules to new evidence, either operational .-)r scientific, that
suggests changes are justified. Such new evidence may be contained in ASRS
occurrence files.
Consequently, the purpose of the study described here was to review and
analyze incident and occurrence reports submitted to the NASA Aviation Safety
Re-orting System (ASRS) relating to fatigue. Specifically, the study was to
examine the hypotheses that skill fatigue** and associated performance decre-
ments occur, and are associated with some combination of the following fac-
tors: (a) circadian desynchronosis, (b) duty time, (c) pre-duty activity, (d)
sleep deficit, (e) work scheduling, (f) workload, (g) environmental depriva-
tion, and (h) other factors found pertinent. The examination was to find
whit sort of confirmation of these hypotheses might exist in ASRS reports and
to discover any relationships that might exist between fatigue factors and
performance decrements. This report presents the findings of the study.
*Refer^nres are listed at the end of the text of the report.
**Skill fatigue - a form of fatigue, as distinguished from mental fatigue,
occurring when a contiruing task, such as piloting: an aircraft, requires com-
plex, coordinated, and accurately timed actions and resulting in a decrement
In the skill with which those actions are performed (4).
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APPROACH
The data to perform the fatigue study were obtained from the NASA ASRS.
A brief description of this program and the analytic procedure follow.
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
In response to concerns expressed by the aviation community about iden-
tifying and revealing unknown, or not widely known, safety hazards, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) implemented a safety reporting program
in 1975 (5). To increase the flow of information into the program NASA was
asked to manage and operate the safety reporting system. They began opera-
tions in April 1976.
The NASA ASRS is a voluntary, confidential reporting system available to
pilots, controllers, and others in the National aviation system. Safety
reports may be submitted by these persons about situations, occurrences or
other matters that they believe may affect air safety. As an inducement to
report, FAA offers a limited waiver of disciplinary action to participants
who may have_nadvertantly violated a Federal Air Regulation.
f
Reports are submitted to ASRS on a structured
mation about aircraft characteristics, weather,
tion, airspace and air traffic control, etc. Also
reporter to describe - in his or tier own words
incident, what happened and why . A copy of the st
Appendix A.
form that provides infor-
experience, type of opera-
space is provided for the
- the circumstances of the
zndard report form is in
Upon receipt of a safety report, NASA safety analysts review the report
for completeness and criticalit y of the reported incident. If the analyst
believes it appropriate, he may contact the reporter for additional informa-
tion. When satisfied that the report is as complete as passible, the analyst
1	 removes from it the names of the reporter and any other persons or organiza-
tions who nav have been identified. The analyst then processes the report
preparing; it for entry info the ASRS data bare. 	 After the safety report
leaves the analvst's possession there is no opportunity to obtain additional
information about the incident. The analyst - to assure the confidentiality
of the reporter - never attempts to corroborate the circumstances of the
reported incident by contacting other parties.
The computer entry for each safety report contains the fixed field
information, the complete text of the reporter's comments, and observations
of the analyst. Also, the processed safety report is prepared in such a
manner that it may be retrieved from the computer data base by searching on
vnrious descriptors or key-words that the analyst has assigned to the report.
For example in this study "fatigue" was used as a search term and a number of
fixed data fields were screened for the presence of the term. NASA reports
(6) present a more complete description of the ASRS data base.
At the time of the stud y
 some 20,000 ASRS reports were available for
analysis. The next section describes how the "fatigue" set was obtained.
Study Procedure
Figure 1 illustrates the strateg y. adopted to determine which of the
reports should be withdrawn from the ASRS database for review. The study's
scope was restricted to consideration of only reports involving air carrier
crewmembers.
General
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Reports resident in the general problem category "flight crew function"
contain reports of a deficiency in flight crew performance. The selection of
only "crewmember" reports assures that the report describes a pilot, or
human, error as witnessed or engaged in; however, reports of performance
!	 deficiencies in other aircraft crewmembers may be obtained.	 The "air car-
t
rier" selection assured that the air transport operation criteria would be
met. The reports drawn from the database at this point made up the primary
f	 test set for the study. The set contained 2006 reports.
The purpose of selecting reports in keyword/descriptor categories other
than fatigue was to assure that every reasonable effort had been made to
locate all reports involving recognized fatigue, whether or not it was con-
sidered the primary factor in the occurrence. The keyword or descriptor
categories selected were perceived as having the most direct bearing or the
independent variables present in the problem statement. The reports thus
obtained were reviewed and a fatigue set established.
To test for operational or behavioral differences that might be more-
or-less uniquely associated with fatigue, a comparison set was also selected.
This set was taken randomly from the primary test set less the reports iden-
tified as the fatigue set.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The test set of 2006 ASRS safety reports represented the population of
air transport flight crew error reports. Applying the screening terms
fatigue, workload, complacency, duty/scheduling, and time-of-day (midnight to
6:00 a.m.) reduced t`ie test set to 426 reports which were selected for
further evaluation. The distribution of reports by screening category is
shown in Table 1. Some reports were retrieved under more than one category.
Bartley and Chute (1) suggest that fatigue is a personal experience,
i.e., what is fatigue to one may not be to another. Two examples show such
to he the case. These are reports of the same incident by two crewmembers.
They shared the same bid sequence, but only one suggests fatigue as a factor.
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TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS
BY SCREENING CATEGORY
Screening
Category
Number
of Reports
Fatigue 71
Workload 225
Complacency 125
Duty/Scheduling 42
Time-of-Day (midnight-0600) 38
"We were as Flight 123-ATL-XYZ 6-FR-79, scheduled to
depart ATL at -- --. Clearance was obtained (for Flt
123) by F/0 from clearance delivery, i.e., 'Common 4 as
filed, squawk 6331'. When we started to taxi we inadver-
tently reverted to the flight number we had just flown
into ATL, Flt 890. We were cleared to 9L as Flt 890. I
heard the F/O use Flt 890 in his transmissions but it
didn't register at that time. We departed as Flt 890 and
departure gave us a new transponder code. When we
changed frequencies again the S/O heard us say 890. He
said we were 123 and I informed ATL center of the Flt
call sign change. They had some problem in identifying
our fli;;ht but contact was eventually established and we
maintained VFR until contact was made. We feel that
there are too many fit number changes in a bid sequence
period.	 Use of the aircraft N number could be a solu-
tion."
"From ATL to XYZ the proper clearance fo r Flt 123 was
received and copied by the 1st officer. (As filed, Com-
mon 4, squawk 6331). Prior to Flt 123, we had flown from
ABC to ATL as Flt 890. When the 1st officer contacted
ground control he inadvertantly reverted to our previous
'rat 890 instead of using Flt 123. We received taxi, tak-
eoff and climb instructions as Flt 890. w ring climbout,
the controller gave us a change of squawk and a change of
frequency. I (2nd officer) had just called our company
with the out and off times of Flt 123, so when I heard
the captain respond to a call for Flt 890 1 told him we
were 123. The captain then told the center that we were
Flt 123 and asked if they had a strip on us which they
did.	 There was some confusion roes tahlishing radar con-
6
rtact, so we maintained VFR until radar contact was	 esta-
blished.	 A	 bid	 sequence with many ilt no. changes and
two early morni'ag checkins probably 	 contributed	 to	 the
confusion over the two flight numbers."
' Within the fatigue set seven of the incidents were reported	 by	 two	 or
more	 crewmembers.	 In	 four	 of	 these	 fatigue	 was cited by only one crew
member. The fact that crewmembers 	 working	 under	 identical	 conditions	 and
involved in the same incident do not report fatigue as a factor in their per-
formance decrement with consistency reinforces the concept that fatigue 	 fre-
quently is a personal experience and that caution must be exercised in making
any generalizations about the presence or absence of fatigue 	 under	 a	 given
set of conditions.
Accordingly the only reports evaluated in the fatigue set used in this
study were those in which fatigue was explicitly stated or implied by the
individual reporting. Applying this criterion reduced the set to the 77
unique incidents whose salient features are listed in Appendix B.
In order to examine possible differences between fatigue reports and
others, a comparison or "control" set of 100 reports was drawn at random from
crewmember reports of flight crew functional problems in air carrier opera-
tions, the population from which the fatigue set had been selected. Fatigue
reports were, of course, excluded from the comparison set. After screening
of these reports to exclude reports in which flight crew behavior was not a
part of the problem, and reports that had been submitted by other than an air
carrier crew member, 56 reports remained. These were analyzed using the same
criteria for the reports as in the fatigue set. Appendix C describes these
reports.
Operational Factors
The fatigue and comparison secs were compared to identify operational
differences.
	
Recovery factors, for example, were examined from the stand-
point of who detected and responded to the flight crew's error.	 The possi-
bilities are:	 the flight crew itself, air traffic control (ATC), or no
recover y . Examples of no recovery include landing or taking off below
7
minimums or with no ATC clearance.	 Table 2 shows the results of this
analysis.
No significant difference is observed between the fatigue and control
sets by chi-square analysis in these categories nor among independent, mutu-
ally exclusive sets of data involving weather, flight time during last 90
days, and types of deviations.
TABLE 2. RECOVERY FACTORS COMPARISON
Flight
Crew ATC None Total
Fatigue set 14 36 27 11
Comparison set 12 29 15 56
The types of deviations reported axe presented in Table 3. Although
many of these terms are self-explanatory and are consistent with ASRS data
base coding procedures, several are not. For example, an altitude deviation
could occur based strictly on flight crew action.
"--- Aircraft cleared over Cash intersection direct Bluf
maintain 11,000. Cleared for 9L profile descent shortly
after passing Rluf. Descent began to 8000. At 9200
realized chart had been misread."
Or an altitude deviation could occur due to crew misunderstanding of a clear-
ance.
"--- Our aircraft had been cleared by Oakland Center to
descend to and maintain FL240 at Modesto VORTAC. Subse-
quently we were given an instruction to expect to cross
Locke intersection at 10000 ft. Upon reaching FL240 we
continued to descend anticipating---"
The former example was classed as an altitude deviation, the latter a
clearance deviation.
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TABLE 3. TYPES OF DEVIATIONS
Deviation Category Fatigue Set Comparison Set
1. Altitude 25 19
2. Clearance 27 18
Take-off without (2) (0)
Landing without (11) (3)
Other (14) (15)
3. Course, Route or Heading 8 4
4. Runway, Taxi Excursions 3 5
or Incursions
S. Operational 7 5
6. Technical 5 2
7. Near Mid-air Collision 1 2
8. Speed 1 1
Tr±* al 77 56
A number of reports were classified as operational deviations. These
reports include approaches to the wrong runway or airport and landings or
take-offs below minimums.
There were five reports in the fatigue set classified as technical devi-
ations. These include the declaration of an emergency to avoid a diversion
to load additional fuel, a report of sleeping crewmembers, landing gross
weight above certificated levels, operating an aircraft overlooking an MEL
restriction, and flying without having flown a required proficiency check
ride.
The distrihution of deviations by flight phase are shown in Table 4.
The category OTUR includes pre-taxi and taxiing incidents.
wpm
i
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TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF DEVIATIONS BY FLIGHT PHASE
light Phase
scent
Test Take-off/ Approach/
Set Climb Cruise Landing Othat Total
Fatigue 11 5 56 5 77
Comparison* 11 10 'l8 6 55
X2 - 7.48	 .10 > p > .05
*One report not coded as to flight phase
Although the differences are not significant*, the deviations within the
fatigue set show a tendency to occur more frequently during the descent,
approach, and landing flight phases. To be noted is that in 14 of the 16
occurrences during the takeoff, climb, and cruise phases, the reporter com-
mented that the deviations took place towards the end of the duty period.
The time of day of the deviations was considered. The information is
coded for six hour _ntervals, i.e., 0000-0600, 0601-1200, 1201-1300,
1801-2400 where this information was coded. The time represents local time
of the incident, not necessari: •• "body time" of the reporter. The results
are shown in Table 5.
The reported deviations occur significantly more frequently between mid-
night and 0600 hours. Moreover there were only 38 midnight to 0600 hours
reporter in the study set of 2006 reports. Thirty one percent of these were
in the fatigue Aet.
*The difference might be significant if t1te reports in the "Other" category
are associated with pre-takeoff and post landing phases.
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TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF DEVIATIONS BY TIME OF DAY
Test
rter of Occurrence--Hours Inclusive
0001- 1- 1- -
Set 0600 1200 1800 2400 Total
Fatigue* 12 14 17 14 57
Comparison** 0 11 29 14 54
X2 - 12.44	 p < .01
*20 reports not coded as to time of day.
**2 reports not coded as to time of day.
Overall, the results obtained from the analysis of operational factors
are not surprising. One would expect a higher proportion of fatigue reports
within the time period midnight to 6:00 a.m. "Back-of-the-clock" flying* has
been alleged to be more fatiguing than operations flown during other hours of
the day. The finding that deviations occur somewhat more frequently during
the descent, approach, and landing flight phases should also be expected. If
fatigue effects do exist, they should be more often observed at the end of a
flight or end of a work day rather than the beginning.
Enabling Factors
Though it is not possible to state with certainty the causes of each of
3 these deviations, it is often possible to list, for a given incident, one or
more "enabling factors": elements in the history of the occurrence without
which the occurrence probably would not have happened. In particular, it is
often possible to state whether a pilot or crew's deviation involved a
'	 failure of perception, cognition, or action.
The working definitions used in this study in categorizing these reports
are as follows:
*Flying during the hours conventionally considered to be devoted to sleep.
11t
1. Perceptual tasks are activities that involve awareness
of: the actual and desired state and position of the air-
plane, the flight duties associated with that perception,
and implementing those duties.
2. Cognitive tasks involve the acquisition, understanding,
and effective utilization of information.
3. Manual tasks involve the manipulation of aircraft con-
trols and aircraft systems.
Table 6 shows the comparison of enabling factor distributions between
the two sets of reports. The distributions shown between the sets in the
table are significantly different. Decrements on monitoring performance
occurred considerably more frequently in the fatigue set. Examples of moni-
toring failures are:
TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF ENABLING FACTORS
Category Fatigue Set
Comparison
Set
1. Perception 40 15
a.	 Monitoring 34 7
b.	 Distraction 6 8
2. Cognition 28 26
a.	 ATC Communication 6 7
b.	 Charts, Publications 6 6
c.	 Instrument Readings 3 1
d.	 Expectations 11 6
e.	 Misunderstanding 2 6
3. Manual 7 15
a.	 Handling Aircraft 3 9
b.	 Setting Instruments 4 6
4. Other 2
Total 77 56
X2 - 11.84, p < .01
"Enroute from BMS to CLE, we were instructed to maintain
airspeed of 300K. We were radar vectored off course of
12
	 I
V-218 south of Windsor VOR. We were further vectored to
intercept V-218 and cross Sheff Intersection at 10,000 ft
230K. The first officer was flying, and began the des-
cent at 300K. I was calculating our situation in regards
to the crossing restriction and did not notice that the
airspeed increased to 320K. Cleveland Center noticed the
increase in speed, and asked if we had received the 300K
restriction. I replied that we had not. We immediately
slowed to 300K and the Center gave us a further airspeed
reduction.	 I informed ATC that with the new airspeed
restriction we could not cross Sheff at 10,000 ft. He
replied that he could take care of it. I estimate that
we were at 320K for no more than one minute. Notice that
although wP had been maintaining 300K before the descent,
I told ATC that we had not received the instructions.
Several seconds later, I realized that I had experienced
a lapse of attention, but did not wish to further aggra-
vate the situation with a long explanation. I believe
that pilot fatigue was directly the cause of my lapse for
the one minute, combined with my being pre-occupied with
figuring whether or not we were going to be able to com-
ply with the 10,000 ft 250K restriction. The cause of
the fatigue was as follows: the trip originated the pre-
vious morning at 0617, requiring me to arise at 0330. I
estimate that I slept 4 hours. The layover was at the
XYZ--- Hotel in St. Paul, Minnesota. The hotel was full
of teen-aged hockey players attending a championship
playoff. The teen-agers were extremely noisy, requiring
many calls from the crew to the front desk, requesting
security people to put an end to the noise. The arising
time for the return trip was 0500.	 I estimate that I
slept 3 or 4 hours."
"On this series of flights, we were approaching New Orle-
ans	 Airport	 (Moisant), which would be our last landing,
and number 10 for the day. 	 Approach vectored us to	 fol-
low
	 acft	 B	 in the pattern also being vectored to land.
We had	 the	 acft	 B	 in	 sight,	 and	 reported	 this	 to
approach,	 but	 were still given vectors after reporting.
As we were vectored to base, the distance between my 	 A/C
and	 the	 acft	 B	 began to close, we started to slow and
began approaching 160 Kts and also the localizer, I asked
the	 first	 officer	 to	 query the controller about going
through the localizer, to which the controller responded,
takeover	 the localizer, cleared visual approach. 	 Things
were very busy from this point on, to get the 	 A/C	 ready
to land and the X/list complete. 	 A we cleared the runway
and called ground control, 	 (who responded cleared to	 the
gate),	 the	 F/0,	 who	 was	 not	 flying,	 stated, I don't
believe we ever talked to the tower. 	 I called	 the	 tower
by	 phone and asked to confirm if we had called.	 He said
we did not. but that 	 there	 was	 no	 problem.	 I	 don't
13
remember approach turning us over at the outer, as is the
normal procedure. Another case of too much to cover in
too little time. Also I realize this is my responsibil-
ity."
The enabling factor "Cognition (expectations)" also occurs relatively
more frequently in the fatigue set. An example follows:
"Acft A descending for landing was cleared to cross Sicky
at 8,000, then descend to and maintain 6,000, by New York
ATC. The first officer was flying the aircraft and the
captain handling the communications. I observed the
first officer descending below 8,000 prior to Sicky and
thought perhaps I misunderstood the clearance or he heard
something I might have missed. The controller picked up
the error with his altitude read out and called it to our
attention. The error made in VFK flight conditions. We
continued to 6,000. I had not flown over this route in
the last 3 or 4 months but had flown it many times previ-
ously.	 As I recall, previous clearances had been cross
Sicky 8,000 or below to maintain 6000. It was this
clearance for many years. Probably I was mentally pro-
grammed for a similar clearance and accepted the first
officers departure from the clearance. This was the last
leg (15th) of an arduous three day sequence and fatigue
was a factor."
Fatigue Factors
A variety of factors were presented as being responsible for the
crewmember's perception that fatigue was associated with the reported devia-
tion. These factors are summarized in Table 7.
As stated previously, incidents were included within the fatigue set
only if fatigue was either explicitly or implicitly cited. A limitation of
the ASRS concept is that the absence of explicit data does not preclude the
possibility that a phenomenon of interest existed within the incident
reported. For example, within the fatigue set ".:re are reports that involve
both long duty periods and long flight times. The possibility certainly
exists that time zone traversal or transmeridian flight, occured. In only
one report, however, was that information provided explicitly, and insuffi-
cient information was provided in the report to permit an appreciation of the
14
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Category
Number of
Citations
1. Pre—duty Activity 3
2. Sleep and Rest 23
a.	 Adequacy of Rest 7
b.	 Disturbed Sleep 16
3. Duty Period 55
a.	 No. of Duty Days 8
b.	 No. of Duty Hours 26
c.	 Flight Hours 8
d.	 End of duty period 13
4. Duty Environment 33
a.	 Night Operation 11
b.	 Weather 6
c.	 Workload Low, or From High to Low
(Low Stimulus) 12
d.	 Discomfort 4
5. Human Factors (Subjective) 5
a.	 Tired, Exhausted 5
6. Workload 18
a.	 Workload High 4
b.	 number of Segments 14
Total 137
t
'F
reporter's physioiigic state, or the direction of flight. For this reason, a
rigorous transformation of the reported fatigue factors into the fatigue fac-
tors selected at the initiation of the study (circadian desynchronosts, duty
time, pre—duty activity, sleep deficit, work scheduling, workload, and
environmental deprivation) is not always possible.
More generally, however, various of the fatigue factor categories may be
related to the study postulate. For example, reports within the categories,
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'disturbed sleep,' and 'night operations' might well be categorized circj
desynchtonosis. Exemplary of reports in these categories are:
"I was captain on flight from SFO to PHL. We had
reported for duty at 0445 pdt. (This was the third day
of a four day schedule, in which we have to get up
between 3 and 4 a.m.) We flew a ferry to RNO and the
flight back to SFO. We departed SFO at 0840. The flight
proceeded normally until descent into PHL. We had been
cleared to 27,000 feet, direct Lancaster. We then
received a clearance to 13 , 000 feet and were asked to
increase our speed as there was traffic behind us. The
first officer was flying the airplane and I was working
the radio. The first officer levelled off at 23,000
feet, thinking he was at 13,000 feet and I reported level
at 13 , 000 feet ,---If
"Copilot was flying the aircraft on night freighter
flight making the Blue Ridge six arrival to DFW, after
passing Blue Ridge VOR he turned to an incorrect heading
or did not properly select his outbound course of 230
deg. This placed the aircraft off to the left
(southeast) of the intended course. Approach control
queried if we showed on the correct radial. 	 We replied
negative. We show slightly off to the left to which he
said you are eight miles off centerline turn right to 250
deg. Although no other aircraft were in the area, situa-
tion could have been potentially dangerous during heavy
traffic periods. Factors contributing: copilot was rela-
tively new and was not thoroughly familiar with STAR.
Captain had switched his VOR to DFW 111.0 in order to
have DyE to help plan a visual approach and did not prop-
erly monitor copilots progress on the 230 deg radial.
Fatigue was n big factor. Crew had reported at midnight
for a 0130 local dept and had been delayed until 0215 L
because of the lack of an aircraft. At the time of
occurrence had been on duty seven hours (all night).
Fighting sleep was difficult on last leg, so alertness
was greatly decreased. As for fatigue - I wish I knew.
I took a 3- hour nap the evening prior to departure, but
since it is impossible to store up sleep, it is 'ifficult
to prepare your body for these cccnsional all night
trips.	 Crew rest regulations are of no help because the
crew rest comes after the fact."
Workload phenomena were revealed in three ways: (1) high workload, (2)
low workload, and (3) high workload followed by low workload. These relate
back to the original postulates of ',q ^^rkluad' and 'environmental deprivation'
(low stimulus). Examples nf the Lhrv.• cotegories follow:
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1. High workload. Flt started approach and proceeded beyond
outer marker for R-4R while RVR was reported below 4000
ft, with a ship reported to be in the channel. (FAR
121-650). Approach was broken off about 100 ft above
minimums, as RVR was still below 4000 ft and ship was
still in the channel, though the ground was visible below
the acft and the end of the runway was in sight. Exe-
cuted missed approach and landed on second approach using
lower minimums as the ship was no longer reported to be
in the channel. This inadvertent, but not in any way
dangerous technical violation was caused by crew fatigue,
extremely cluttered up approach plate for this rwy (fine
print notes, etc.) and conditions of moderate to hvy tur-
bulence and wind shears. Crew was unexpectedly called up
for this trip at 0030, departure time was to be 0700.
Between being awakened, packing bag, setting alarm
clocks, short sleep time was avail. Mgmt refuses to ack
that pilots are not computers with a sleep and awake call
out. Appeals to FAA have not helped in any way. Small
print and cluttered approach plate are fine when you are
_ sitting at a desk, but are not satisfactory under such
adverse conditions as changing light conditions, turbu-
lence, having to listen to and ack multiple clearances,
and most importantly, fly the airplane. I sincerely
believe that we received at least 20 messages (wx and
clearances) in about 30 min."
2. High workload to low. "After landing on rwy 5 at BUF, we
cleared the runway and began taxiing southwest toward the
terminal. A tailwind and light airplane caused speed to
pick up rapidly approaching rwy 14-32. By the time the
F/0 contacted ground control I was about to enter 14-32
s at too high a speed to stop. I remembered that about the
time we received our landing clearance on rwy 5 the tower
also cleared a light plane to land on rwy 32 (I was
ereatly relieved to see the absence of an aircraft in the
approach area of rwy 32). The F/0 made contact with
ground as we began to cross the runway and with resigna-
tion he cleared us to the gate. I think fatigue caused a
lapse in procedures and awareness on the part of both of
us. It had been a long day and it was almost over, with
only one more leg to go. Also, BUF is not as busy an
airport as ORD, from where we departed. Our senses were
Just. not as sharp in a more quiet environment than the
busy ones we encounter more frequently.
3. Low workload. "Landed without tower clearance, Stapleton
Int'1; Airport, Denver Co. Fairly new first officer.
Approach control cleared flt in and down unusually smooth
and efficient for Denver approach, probably due to late
hour and light traffic. One aircraft ahead was on, and
clear of runway by the time we were over the OM.
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Approach had cleared us direct to the FAF and then for a
visual approach to 26L at Stapleton with the normal call
hours and checks. I mistakenly thought the F/0 had
called the tower at the FAF or on final. As we touched
down, Approach asked are you still here? I called the
tower by phone and he assured me there was no problem due
to no other traffic involved and the late hour. 	 I sure
felt dumb letting this gel by me."
Of interest is that, in the fatigue set, situations wherein the workload
is low occur relatively more frequently than when workload is high. From
Table 7 we see that an estimate of the workload level was made in only 16
reports. If we assume that in the remaining 61 reports workload was nominal,
then one could infer that fatigue related performance decrements are more
frequently associated with situations of nominal or low workload. The notion
must rest, unresol •ied, at this time, since these data do not permit explicit
quantification of workload.
An examination of the fatigue reports suggested that further insight
might be gained by analyzing along the more r_strictive lines of 2oTlX dirty,
sleep, or rest and pre-duty considerations. This classification resulted in
the assignment of 45, 26, and 6 incidents to these categories, respectively.
The individual classifications are noted in Appendix A.
The most notable feature of the six incidents in the rest and pre-duty
activity category is that five occurred within the time period 0601 to 1200
hours. The sixth was not coded as to time of occurrence.
The reports in the duty and sleep categories were compared independently
with the factors previously described in the control set. The only differ-
ence found related to time of day of occurrence. Table 8 shows the distribu-
tion of sleep and duty incidents by time of day.
We found that when duty and sleep occurrences were combined significant
differences were observed between the fatigue and control sets. When con-
sidered separately, the duty subset is not significantly different (X2
5.56, p < .2).
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TABLE 8. TIME OF DAY COMPARISON BY SLEEP
AND DUTY FATIGUE FACTORS
Test
Set
Quarter of Occurrence-Hours Inclusive
0000-0600 0601-1200 1201-1800 1801-2400
Duty* 4 2 14 13
Sleep** 8 7 3 1
Control*** 0 11 29 14
*	 12 reports not coded as to time of day
**	 7 reports not coded as to :imp of day
*** 2 reports not coded as to time of day
This finding suggests that a fatigue state may be associated indepen-
dently with either sleep or duty factors. The manifestation of the fatigue
state in a crew's behavior remains the same.
The category most frequently cited by crewmembers relates to duty
period. About half of these were duty times of 12 hours or more. The fol-
lowing is exemplary of duty period reports.
"I was flying as first officer aboard lgt acr air lines
flight A enroute from Salt Lake City to San Francisco
Intl Airport. Approx XX30 local, a lgt acr B was
observed to pass from right to left 90 degrees to our
flight path at the same altitude. The distance from us
to him at the moment we passed through his jet was
estimated by me to be two miles - certainly no nearer
than one mile. The other aircraft was acquired visually
and no evasive action was judged necessary to avoid col-
lision. Prior to the incident noted above, our aircraft.
A. had been cleared by Oakland Center to descend to and
maintain FL240 at Modesto VORTAC. Subsequently we were
given an instruction to expect to cross Locke Intersec-
tion (on the transition to rwy at SFO) at 10000 ft. Upon
reaching FL240 during our descent we continued to descend
anticipating crossing Locke Intersection at 10000 ft. We
had both (captain and first officer) misinterpreted the
Instruction by center as constituting further clearance
to descend to 10000 ft by Locke when in fact, we were
19
ronly cleared to 260. At FL230 the above mentioned clear-
ance incident with aeft B occurred. Acr B was maintain-
ing FL230 as per ARTC clearance. By the time we had ver-
ified our own altitude clearance limit and realised the
situation, the two aircraft had passed one another safely
with both crews, I assume, swearing among themselves at
the crew of the other aircraft and also at ARTC. The
weather was broken clouds but clear at flight level. The
crew of Acr A had already exceeded the limit of 8 hours
of hard flying time in a 24 hour period and had been on
duty for approx 12 hours due to actual instrument
approaches and holding delays earlier in the day. I, for
one, was very fatigued mentally and physically and am
sure this contributed to the less than sharp execution of
my duties."
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Performance decrements which we believe to be related to fatigue have
been reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. They have resulted in
errors and 4nw nted occurrences in air transport operations. The fatigue-
related performance decrements are, however, infrequently reported in rela-
tion to the total number of reported air transport crewmember performance
decrements.
The factors most frequently cited as being responsible for the fatigue
state were duty period and duty environment factors. These were followed by
sleep and rest factors. The information presently within the ASKS database
U.Jes not permit an analysis in depth of the effect of such factors as sleep
deprivation, transmeridian flight or circadian desynchronosis.
The types of aircrew deviations that were reported in the fatigue-
associated set do not differ from those occurring in a ;;omparison set. How-
ever, these deviations appear with somewhat greater frequency during the des-
cent, approach and landing flight phases, and are reported with signific6ntly
greater frequency during the first quarter of the day.
Performance decrements associated with awareness and attention were
observed si-,nifteantly more frequently in the fatigue-associated set.
20
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Based on these findings, we conclude:
1. That fatigue-associated performance decrements occur;8 
2. That fatigue-associated performance decrements can pro-
duce potentially hazardous conditions;
3. That only a small fraction of performance decrements
reported to ASRS are associated with fatigue by their
reporters;
4. That the performance decrements associated with fatigue
differ in frequency, but not in kind, from those occur-
ring in its absence;
!- S. That failures in monitoring tasks are described fre-
quently in fatigue-associated performance decrements
reports;
6. That long duty periods, large numbers of flight segments,
and disturbed sleep are frequently reported as the rea-
sons for fatigue associated with performance decrements;
7. That the ASRS data do not permit a conclusion as to the
}	 effect of circadian desynchronosis on flying performance.
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